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Non-technical summary 
Collaborative research and development (R&D) may be seen as a response to shifting 
knowledge environments enabling firms to cope with technological challenges. As stressed 
by Jones (2008), innovation increases the stock of knowledge and hence the “educational 
burden” of future cohorts of innovators. One way to compensate this development may be 
specialization in expertise. However, narrowing expertise requires firms to seek 
complementary know-how elsewhere, for instance by collaborating in knowledge-intensive 
business areas like R&D.  
While numerous previous studies found R&D alliances to be instruments used by firms 
to acquire new skills and to source specialized know-how (e.g. Hamel, 1991; Hagedoorn, 
1993; Hagedoorn and  Schakenraad, 1994; Powell et al., 1996), none of these studies paid 
attention to differences in the objective of the R&D collaboration and how these differences 
affect R&D productivity. Collaboration aiming at the joint generation of new knowledge, that 
is firms willing to undertake an R&D project jointly, may differ substantially from alliances 
aiming at the explicit exchange of already existing knowledge. This difference may translate 
into differences with respect to the alliances’ effects on R&D productivity and eventually 
innovation output. Furthermore, while previous empirical studies found evidence for a 
positive effect of collaborations on innovation output, often measured in the number of 
patents, the effects on the technological value of these patents has not been studied to the 
same extent. 
Using count data models controlling for unobserved heterogeneity for R&D-active 
manufacturing firms in Flanders in the period 2000 to 2009, this study aims to fill these gaps. 
We study the effects of R&D collaboration on patent activity in terms of quantity as well as 
quality differentiating between collaborative agreements by their declared objectives. The 
results suggest that being engaged in knowledge exchange alliances leads to more patent 
applications filed by the firms involved. However, once patent quality – as measured by the 
number forwards citations received in a five-year-window of the application date - is 
considered, we find knowledge creation alliances to lead to more valuable patents. In line 
with recent literature on strategic patenting, these results may indicate that patenting of 
collaborating firms is not only used to protect intellectual property, but also as a strategic 
tool. In other words, joint R&D may provide incentives to file patents that are indeed aimed 
at protecting valuable inventions from imitation by others, while exchange alliances drive 
“portfolio patenting” which has been shown to result in fewer citations for the individual 
patent. 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Zusammenarbeit in Forschung und Entwicklung (F&E) stellt eine Reaktion auf sich 
zunehmend schnell verändernde Wissensumgebungen dar, die Unternehmen ermöglicht 
technologische Herausforderungen zu meistern. Wie Jones (2008) betont, erhöhen 
Innovationen den Wissenstock und somit die „Fort- und Weiterbildungslast“ zukünftiger 
Innovatoren. Um dies zu kompensieren, können Unternehmen sich spezialisieren. 
Spezialisierung bedeutet aber auch, dass notwendiges komplementäres Wissen extern 
bezogen werden muss, beispielsweise durch Zusammenarbeit und Kooperationen in 
wissensintensiven Unternehmensbereichen wie der F&E.  
Zahlreiche Studien unterstreichen daher die Bedeutung technologischer Zusammenarbeit 
für den Erwerb neuer Kompetenzen und für den Zugang zu spezialisiertem Wissen (e.g. 
Hamel, 1991; Hagedoorn, 1993; Hagedoorn and  Schakenraad, 1994; Powell et al., 1996). 
Keine dieser Studien berücksichtigt allerdings Unterschiede in der Ausgestaltung von F&E- 
Zusammenarbeit im Hinblick auf den Inhalt und die Ziele solcher Allianzen. Zusammenarbeit 
mit dem Ziel gemeinsam neues Wissen zu schaffen, d.h. gemeinsame F&E Projekte 
durchzuführen, kann sich essentiell von solchen Allianzen unterscheiden, die den Austausch 
von bereits existierendem Wissen als wesentliches Ziel beinhalten. Diese Unterschiede 
können sich in der Wirkung der Zusammenarbeit auf die F&E-Produktivität und somit auf das 
Innovationsergebnis der beteiligten Unternehmen niederschlagen. Während bisherige Studien 
zwar Hinweise auf einen positiven Effekt von kooperativer F&E auf den Innovationserfolg - 
häufig gemessen an der Anzahl der Patentanmeldungen der beteiligten Unternehmen - fanden, 
blieb der Aspekt der Art der Kollaboration sowie des technologischen Wertes der 
resultierenden Patente weitgehend unbeachtet.  
Mit dem Ziel diese Lücken in der Literatur zu schließen, untersucht die folgende Studie 
die Effekte von F&E-Kooperationen auf die Patentaktivitäten der beteiligten Unternehmen. 
Dabei unterscheiden wir zwischen Allianzen mit dem Ziel gemeinsam neues Wissen zu 
schaffen und solchen mit dem Ziel bestehendes Wissen auszutauschen. Die Datenbasis ist ein 
Panel F&E-aktiver Unternehmen in Flandern beobachtet über den Zeitraum 2000 bis 2009. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Unternehmen in Austauschallianzen signifikant mehr Patente 
anmelden. Allerdings sind diese Patente nicht technologisch “wertvoller” als die nicht-
kooperierender Unternehmen gemessen an der Zahl der Zitationen, die diese Patente im 
Durchschnitt in den fünf Jahren nach der Anmeldung erhalten. Wissenschaffende Allianzen, 
auf der anderen Seite, resultieren in wertvolleren Patenten. Im Einklang mit aktueller 
Forschung zu strategischem Patentieren deuten diese Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass 
kooperierende Unternehmen nicht ausschließlich zum Schutze ihres intellektuellen Eigentums 
patentieren, sondern auch aus strategischen Gründen. Mit anderen Worten, während 
gemeinsame F&E in der Tat Anreize schafft, resultierende Erfindungen Patentieren zu lassen, 
um diese wertvollen Erfindungen vor Imitation zu schützen, können Austauschallianzen zu 
Patentanmeldung mit dem Ziel ein Patentportfolio aufzubauen führen. Wie vorherige 
Forschung zeigt, ist diese Form des Patentierungsverhaltens dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass 
einzelne Patente innerhalb des Portfolios weniger Zitationen erhalten. 
  
 
 
 
Quantity or Quality? 
Collaboration Strategies in Research and Development  
and Incentives to Patent∗  
 
 
Hanna Hottenrott a,b and Cindy Lopes-Bento a,b,c 
 
a) K.U.Leuven, Dept. of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation, Leuven 
b) Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim 
c) CEPS/INSTEAD, Luxembourg 
 
 
 
July 2012 
 
Abstract 
This study shows for a large sample of R&D-active manufacturing firms that 
collaborative R&D has a positive effect on firms’ patenting in terms of both quantity 
and quality. When distinguishing between alliances that aim at joint creation of new 
knowledge and alliances that aim at exchange of existing knowledge, the results 
suggest that the positive effect on patent quantity is driven by knowledge exchange 
rather than joint R&D. Firms engaged in joint R&D, on the other hand, receive more 
forward citations per patent indicating that joint R&D enhances patent quality. In light 
of literature on strategic patenting, our results further suggest that knowledge creation 
alliances lead to patents that are filed to protect valuable intellectual property, while 
exchange alliances drive ‘portfolio patenting’, resulting in fewer forward citations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Collaborative research and development (R&D) may be seen as a response to shifting 
knowledge environments enabling firms to cope with technological challenges. As stressed 
by Jones (2008), innovation increases the stock of knowledge and hence the ‘educational 
burden’ of future cohorts of innovators. One way to compensate this development may be 
specialization in expertise. However, narrowing expertise requires firms to seek 
complementary know-how elsewhere, for instance by collaborating in knowledge-intensive 
business areas like R&D.  
Indeed, numerous previous studies found such R&D alliances to be instruments used by 
firms to acquire new skills and to source specialized know-how (e.g. Hamel, 1991; 
Hagedoorn, 1993; Hagedoorn and  Schakenraad, 1994; Powell et al., 1996). Based on the 
presumption that R&D collaboration and knowledge alliances involve voluntary knowledge 
sharing and pooling of competencies, it has been argued that joint R&D not only reduces 
unintended spillovers to the partnering firm(s)1, but also has the potential to increase R&D 
productivity (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Van Ophem et al., 2001; Branstetter and 
Sakakibara, 2002 among others). 
R&D collaborations can take different forms from equity joint ventures to non-equity 
contractual arrangements.2 Such alliances, however, may also differ in their design depending 
on their declared objective. Collaboration aiming at the joint generation of new knowledge, 
thus firms willing to undertake an R&D project jointly, may differ substantially from 
alliances aiming at the explicit exchange of knowledge. This difference may translate into 
differences with respect to the alliances’ effects on R&D productivity and eventually 
innovation output.  
However, while many studies analyze the effect of collaboration on innovation output, 
to the best of our knowledge, no study exists that distinguishes between knowledge exchange 
alliances (i.e. collaborations that aim at the exchange of already existing knowledge) and 
knowledge creation alliances (i.e. collaborations that aim at jointly developing new 
knowledge. The following study builds on the OECD R&D-survey that provides an explicit 
                                                 
1
 A large literature based on economic theory analyzed possible welfare benefits from R&D consortia 
stemming from the internalization of knowledge externalities and hence, improved incentives to invest in R&D 
which spur technological advances (see e.g. Katz 1986, D’Aspremont and Jaquemin 1988, or Leahy and Neary 
1997). Empirical studies, therefore, focused on the effects on the technology performance of firms engaged in 
R&D alliances assuming that improved R&D output is welfare enhancing. 
2
 See Hagedoorn et al. (2000) and Caloghirou et al. (2003) for comprehensive overviews. 
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question on the objective of a firm’s R&D collaboration that allows us to differentiate 
between firms engaging in either one (or both) these types of collaboration. 3 
Moreover, the effect of collaborative R&D on the value of the generated knowledge has 
received little attention so far. While previous empirical studies found evidence for a positive 
effect on innovation output, often measured in the number of patents, the effects on the value 
or technological relevance of these patents has not been studied to the same extent. The 
following analysis aims to fill these gaps by studying the effects of R&D collaboration on 
patent activity in terms of quantity as well as quality, differentiating between collaborative 
agreements by the declared objectives of the alliance.  
For the purpose of this study, we focus on R&D-active manufacturing firms in Flanders 
observed in the period 2000 to 2009. Estimating Poisson regression models that account for 
unobserved heterogeneity and feedback effects, our results suggest that R&D collaborations 
increase patent output. In particular, being engaged in knowledge exchange alliances leads to 
more patent applications filed by the firms involved. However, once patent quality – as 
measured by the number forwards citations received in a five-year-window of the application 
date - is considered, we find knowledge creation alliances to lead to more valuable patents. In 
line with recent studies on strategic patenting (e.g. Blind et al., 2009), these results point to 
the conclusion that exchange alliances may induce strategic patenting which increases the 
number of patent applications, but leading to a patent portfolio of strategic rather than 
technological value.  
The reminder of this article is structured as follows. The following two sections review 
the related literature and set out our hypotheses. The subsequent sections describe the set-up 
of our econometric analysis and the data before we present the results and conclude. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The impact of collaboration on innovation output has been of interest in economic literature 
for many years now. In line with this literature we analyze if and to what extent, innovation 
output in terms of patent quality and quantity differs depending on whether a firm engages in 
a (certain type of) collaboration for its R&D activities.   
The empirical literature studying the relationship between R&D collaboration and 
innovation performance at the firm level so far can be roughly divided into three streams. 
                                                 
3
 More precisely, the survey asks the question of whether an existing R&D collaboration was set up to 
combine resources and abilities for the joint undertaking of an R&D project with the ambition to generate new 
knowledge or whether the collaboration aims at exchanging existing knowledge by one or several consortium 
partners in order to enable or facilitate its commercialization.   
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First, drawing from the argument that patents as tools to appropriate returns from R&D 
reflect successful R&D outcome, several studies investigated the effects of collaborative 
R&D on the patent productivity of the firms involved. Firms involved in R&D partnerships 
may benefit from a multitude of channels, like gaining access to complementary 
technological, marketing and manufacturing know-how and in some cases financial resources 
that reduce time and resource requirements which speeds up the R&D process (e.g. Mody, 
1993, Mowery et al., 1996). Therefore a positive relationship is expected and indeed, these 
studies covering a variety of countries and industries generally find support for this 
hypothesis.  
Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) were among the first to find that a firm’s propensity 
to patent is significantly higher among R&D collaborators in a sample of companies in the 
Netherlands. Similarly, Van Ophem et al. (2001) find that firms participating in research 
partnerships file more patents than firms focusing on internal R&D only. Czarnitzki and Fier 
(2003) show that collaborating firms in Germany are more likely to patent than non-
collaborating firms. Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) study patenting activities of Japanese 
firms engaged in government-sponsored research consortia. They find that larger spillovers 
(measured by technological proximity between participating firms) improve research 
productivity and are therefore associated with more patent applications in subsequent years. 
Moreover, their results suggest that the benefits are stronger for consortia aiming at basic 
research. Sampson (2005) finds a positive effect of recent collaboration experience on patent 
output of participating firms in the telecom equipment industry. Czarnitzki et al. (2006) find 
positive effects of collaboration on patent applications in Finland and conclude that 
innovation output could be improved by innovation policy that provides incentives to 
collaborate. Peeters and van Pottelsberghe (2006) find a positive relationship between an 
outward-oriented innovation strategy reflected in R&D partnerships and the size of firms’ 
patent portfolios. Finally, Vanhaverbeke et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between 
technology alliances and patent citations. Thus, with the exception of the latter study, 
previous evidence reports evidence for a positive effect of collaboration on the quantity of 
patents rather than on their quality.  
In the second stream of literature, studies do not use patents, but direct measures of 
innovation output. Deeds and Hill (1996) study 132 biotechnology firms and the effects of 
their alliance activity on the rate of new product development. They find an inverted U-shape 
relationship between the number of alliances and new product development, indicating that 
the beneficial effects diminish as the number of alliances increases and that at high levels the 
  
5 
 
cost of entering an additional alliance outweigh the benefits. Schilling and Phelps (2007) 
argue that the design of alliance networks affects their potential for knowledge creation. 
When studying 1,106 firms in 11 industry-level alliance networks, they find firms in alliance 
networks that exhibit both high clustering and high reach measured in short average path 
lengths to a wide range of firms, have greater innovative output than firms in networks that 
do not exhibit these characteristics. Hoang and Rothaermel (2010) investigate 412 R&D 
projects of large pharmaceutical companies in the period 1980 and 2000 and show that 
exploitation alliances have a positive effect on R&D project performance as measured by the 
successful termination of the project, while exploration alliances have a negative effect. Most 
recent, Gnyawali and Park (2011) analyze in a case study setting collaboration between 
‘industry giants’ and conclude that such R&D alliances foster technological advances. 
The third stream uses - instead of patents – output measures derived from firm-level 
survey data. These output indicators include, for instance, firms’ sales from product 
innovations and sales growth, but also more general performance measures like employment 
growth, and the firms labor productivity  (e.g., Klomp and van Leeuwen, 2001; van Leeuwen, 
2002; Lööf and Heshmati, 2002; Janz et al., 2004; Belderbos et al., 2004a,b; Faems et al., 
2005). These studies generally find positive effects, but do not distinguish the type or 
objective of collaboration.4 
Our present study follows the first stream of literature using patent data as key indicator 
of interest, because of mainly two reasons. First, patents are a widely used and recognized 
measure in the literature.5 Indeed, they do not only constitute a measure of technological 
effectiveness of R&D which is comparable across firms and even industries (Katila, 2001; 
Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005; Somaya et al., 2007), they also confer property rights upon 
the assignee and therefore have a direct economic impact. Second, given that forward 
citations per patent are a recognized measure of the quality of the underlying technology or 
invention, using patents as our key indicator allows us to analyze the impact of the (type of) 
collaboration on both, patent quantity as well as quality, an aspect that so far received much 
less attention.  
Furthermore, the incentives to patent a new invention also depend on firms’ innovation 
strategy. We therefore argue that using patents as indicators allows us to study effects of 
collaboration also on patent strategy. Previous studies employing patent indicators as success 
                                                 
4
 Belderbos et al. (2004a) study differences between types of partners on sales of innovative products for a 
sample of Dutch firms and find positive effects from collaboration with universities and competitors. 
5 See Grilliches (1990) for a survey. 
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indicator so far may underestimate the strategic role of patents and in particular the fact that 
collaborative R&D directly affect firms’ patent strategy. Hence, by differentiating between 
collaboration agreements aimed at knowledge exchange and at joint knowledge creation, the 
current study intents to contribute to the existing literature in terms of taking into account 
heterogeneity in the declared purpose of R&D alliances and by considering the effects on 
patent quantity as well as quality.  
 
3. HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Collaboration and innovation performance 
Previous well-known firm-level research suggests that a firm’s innovativeness directly 
depends on its knowledge-base (e.g. Griliches, 1984, 1990; Pakes and Grilliches, 1984; 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). Thus, as a firm’s knowledge base increases through 
collaboration, a positive effect on innovation output can be expected. In line with evidence of 
firms’ motives to engage in collaborative R&D6, we therefore expect a positive effect from 
R&D collaboration on patenting as a result of the broadening of the firms’ knowledge and the 
acceleration of their innovation processes. Moreover, since the benefits from collaboration on 
a key corporate activity like R&D comes at the cost of secrecy, collaboration may likely 
increase the need for patent protection because it implies, at least to some extent, disclosing 
knowledge to the external partner. A legally enforceable protection mechanism such as a 
patent is therefore crucial for clarifying ownership not only for the firms pre-existing 
knowledge-base, but especially for co-developed inventions. Therefore, patents are likely to 
play a key role in the innovation process of collaborating firms as they seek to establish their 
property rights by patent protection. Both arguments stand in favor of a positive effect of 
R&D alliances on patenting activity:  
Hypothesis 1: Firms engaged in collaborative R&D in period t file, on average, more patents 
than non-collaborating firms in subsequent periods.  
Analogous to bibliographic analyses, the technological relevance or quality of patents can be 
approximated by the number of citations a patent receives in subsequent patent applications 
(forward citations). When a patent is applied for, the inventor (and/or the patent examiner) 
notes all of the previous patents that the patent is based on. These citations, thus, identify the 
                                                 
6
 See Hagedoorn et al. (2000) for a survey on firms’ incentives to engage in R&D alliances. What they all have 
in common is that firms’ expect the collaboration to be beneficial.  
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technological lineage of the invention. The number of forward citations received is therefore 
often used as a measure for patent quality as they can serve as an indicator for the 
technological importance of the patent. Traijtenberg (1990) and Harhoff et al. (1999, 2003) 
provide evidence of the correlation between patent value and citations received in subsequent 
patent applications. Also Hall et al. (2005) provide empirical evidence for a strong positive 
correlation between these citations and the estimated market value of the underlying 
invention. Patent citations are thus accepted as a reliable value indicator.7 Because of the 
value creation potential of collaborations that pool firms’ resources and exploit possible 
complementarities in expertise, we expect collaboration not only to lead to more patents, but 
also to more valuable patents.  
Hypothesis 2: Patents filed by R&D collaborators receive on average more forward citations 
(in a five year window after the filing date) than patents filed by non-collaborative firms.  
3.2 Creation Alliances, Exchange Alliances and innovation performance 
Despite the substantial literature on R&D collaboration in both strategic management and 
industrial organization, surprisingly little attention is being paid to the different purposes of 
R&D alliances and how they translate into effects on output indicators like patents.  
Firms engaged in knowledge creation alliances may benefit from the combination of 
resources in the R&D process, access to technological capabilities and the exploitation of 
complementary know-how which translates into higher R&D productivity. Indeed, rather 
than the firms seeking to absorb the knowledge of the partner, each partner focuses on 
deepening and contributing its own knowledge in a way that complements the knowledge of 
the other partner (Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006).8 It can thus easily be argued that a joint 
R&D undertaking has a larger impact on R&D outcome as it involves a deeper dig into the 
partners’ competencies and may allow exploitation of complementary assets in the 
knowledge production process. Moreover, joint R&D involves direct on-the-job exchange 
between R&D employees, allowing the transfer of tacit knowledge that goes beyond the 
current project (Mowery et al., 1996). Even in the case of co-specialization, firms learn from 
the partner’s processes and may benefit from that for R&D outside the collaboration.  
                                                 
7
 Numerous authors have concentrated on the analysis of indicators to determine the economic value of patents. 
See Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) for an overview. However, one limitation to the use of patent citations is 
that citations can indicate further technological development and hence a depreciation of the invention over 
time. That is why it is resonable to limit the time window for forward citations when interpreting them as quality 
indicators. 
8
 An example for a joint R&D undertaking is the joint venture called S-LCD between Samsung Electronics and 
Sony Corporation set up to develop and manufacture flat-screen LCD TV panels (see Gnyawali and Park, 2011 
for the case study). 
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The effects from knowledge exchange alliances on firms’ innovation output and their 
incentives to patent are less clear. Knowledge exchange alliances may differ from creation 
alliances in the depth of the mutual involvement. Exchange of knowledge does not 
necessarily need to be mutual. For example, the case of R&D alliances between established 
pharmaceutical firms and small biotechnology firms described by Stuart (2000) can be 
labeled knowledge exchange collaboration. These are designed such that the pharmaceutical 
firm provides funding for a research project to its partner and in exchange acquires the right 
to observe the R&D of the biotechnology firm usually without actively contributing to the 
development of new knowledge. Given that knowledge exchange alliances do not involve 
joint research and development activities, they may trade explicit knowledge rather than tacit 
knowledge that would only be transmitted during a joint project. Thus, we expect that 
Hypothesis 3: Knowledge creation alliances have a larger positive effect on the number of 
patent applications than exchange alliances as the former type involves more intense pooling 
of competencies and transfer of tacit knowledge. 
Moreover, as creation alliances involve new R&D by definition (knowledge exchange 
alliances may or may not trigger additional internal R&D), we would not only expect an 
effect on the number of new patents filed but also on the quality of the patents filed, i.e. on 
the number of forward citations recieved. Indeed, as joint R&D is associated with transaction 
costs as well as the cost of spilling precious knowldege to the partner, firms may jointly 
undertake R&D projects only if they are expected to be sufficiently valuable to cover these 
costs. Indeed, in the case of joint R&D, the main purpose of a patent application would 
generally be the protection of the innovation rather than a strategic motive. As staged by 
Blind et al. (2009), firms using patents in non-strategic ways, but for their initially intended 
purpose of protecting innovations from imitation, receive on average a higher number of 
forward citations for their patents than companies that emphasize the strategic motives like 
blocking and exchange. As valuable R&D would result in prior art technology, this would be 
reflected in a high number of citations received by resulting patents. We thus hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 4: Knowledge creation alliances have a larger effect on patent quality measured 
by the number of forward citations received than knowledge exchange alliances. 
3.3 Collaboration and strategic motives to patent 
As argued before, we also expect collaboration to affect firms’ incentives to patent. Strategic 
patenting literature suggests that firms patent for many more reasons than the protection of 
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their intellectual property through the exclusion of others.9 According to Arundel and Patel 
(2003) all patents that are filed for motives other than the protection of the inventions in order 
to appropriate returns from the firms’ R&D investments can be defined as strategic. Firms 
may strategically chose patent breadth and thus, for instance, may file more, but smaller 
patents or may refrain from patenting certain innovations. Thus, strategic motives to patent 
may have a substantial impact on the overall number of patent filings (Arundel, 2001; 
Arundel and Patel, 2003; Cohen et al., 2002; Blind et al., 2006; Thumm, 2004).   
These strategic motives to patent comprise the possibility to block competitors in order 
to secure the firms’ technological space against competitors which stresses the importance of 
patent portfolios compared to individual patents. Patents have also become tradable assets 
that play a crucial role for firm value in many technological fields. Additionally, 
advancements in the market for technology allow patent holders active in complex 
technologies to generate licensing revenues (Gulati, 1998; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 
1996; Arundel and Patel, 2003; Noel and Schankerman, 2006).  
If the prevailing motive to patent is the protection of the firms’ technological 
knowledge base compared to strategic motives, one can assume, as explained in the previous 
hypothesis, that the firms expect the protected invention to be rather valuable. If, however, 
blocking of competitors or other strategic reasons are the key motives of filing a patent, these 
objectives can be achieved by patents of rather mediocre quality (Blind at al. 2009). 
Moreover, blocking competitors can be related to a higher number of patents per se as 
blocking will be more successful if competitors are confronted with a higher number of 
patents claiming different aspects of a technology. Hence, the average quality of strategic 
patents is likely to be lower.  
A similar argument can be made for firms intending to use their patent portfolio as bargaining 
chips in future R&D collaborations. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) for instance show that patents 
facilitate division of competencies in the semi-conductor industry since the increasing 
complexity of products requires the combination of several technologies. Firms can therefore 
signal their technological competencies by a large patent portfolio. Thus, if the collaboration 
induces strategic patents as opposed to collaboration resulting in relevant and valuable 
technology where the main purpose of the patent lies in IP protection, we expect that such  
Hypothesis 5: Collaboration leads to a higher number of patent applications, but a lower 
number of forward citations for each of these patents.  
                                                 
9
 Several surveys provide evidence on the strategic value of patents (see e.g. Harabi 1995; Cohen et al. 
2002; Blind et al. 2006). 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND DATA  
4.1 Patent production function and econometric models 
The aim of the following analysis is to investigate the role played by R&D collaboration on 
firms’ patenting behavior. Indeed, when undertaking R&D activities, a firm can choose 
between (i) entering a collaborative agreement for the undertaking of its R&D activities and, 
if it does so, (ii) between whether this agreement should be based on joint knowledge creation 
or on the mere exchange of already existing knowledge.  
Based on a panel of Flemish manufacturing firms with at least 5 employees (data to be 
described in the following section), we test the hypotheses derived in the previous section. In 
a first step, we are therefore interested in whether the different types of collaborative 
agreement have differing impacts on the number of patent applications filed. In a second step, 
we want to know if, and to what extent, the type of collaboration alliance impacts patent 
quality. In order to investigate this phenomenon, we count the number of times subsequent 
patent applications refer to filed patents of a firm in our sample as relevant prior art. Forward 
citations are typically interpreted as proxy for the importance, the quality or the significance 
of a patented invention. Previous studies have shown that forward citations are highly 
correlated with the social value (Trajtenberg, 1990) and the private value of the patented 
invention (Harhoff et al., 1999, Hall et al., 2005). Furthermore, forward citations reflect the 
economic and technological importance as perceived by the inventors themselves (Hall et al., 
2005) and knowledgeable peers in the technology domain (Albert et al., 1991). 
In order to explore our research questions empirically, we estimate a patent production 
function of the type first introduced by Pakes and Griliches (1980). The patent production 
function relates the number of patent applications made by a firm in a given year along with 
various firm specific characteristics. Because the number of filed patent applications is a non-
negative integer value with many zeros and ones, we apply, as commonly done in the 
literature, count data models hypothesizing that the expected number of patent applications 
applied for during a given year is an exponential function of firm characteristics: 
i,t+1|i,t = exp	i,t+ 	i                                     (1) 
where PATi,t+1 denotes the number of patents applied for by firm i in period t+1 and Xi,t is a 
vector of control variables, where i = 1, ..., N indexes the firm and t = 1, .. T indexes the time 
period. The number of patent applications is forwarded by one period in order to allow for a 
time lag between collaboration effects and patenting activity, hence avoiding direct 
simultaneity. i
  
is an overall time-invariant mean that measures the average patenting rates 
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across firms, adjusting for the mix of the firms in the sample. The model for average citations 
per patent is defined analogously.10 
Our baseline model is a Poisson model. Following Blundell et al. (1995, 2002), we 
relax the assumption of strict exogeneity and account for unobserved time-invariant firm 
heterogeneity by using the pre-sample patent stock as a proxy for the unobserved 
heterogeneity component i. Indeed, as shown by Blundell et al. (1995, 2002), if the main 
source of unobserved heterogeneity is routed in the different values of the outcome variable 
Yi with which the firms enter the sample (thus, patents in our case), the unobserved 
heterogeneity can be approximated by including the log of the Yi from a pre-sample period 
average (Pre-sample Mean Approach, PSM). As suggested by Blundell et al., we define a 
dummy variable equal to one if a firm had never filed a patent within the pre-sample period. 
Given that the PSM Approach controls for time-invariant heterogeneity across firms, it helps 
reducing serial correlation and overdispersion. In line with the literature (see e.g. Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001; Somaya et al., 2007), the remaining overdispersion, as reported the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998), is interpreted as a diagnostic that we 
should report robust standard errors rather than as a rejection of the Poisson model in favour 
of a model where the variance is proportional to the mean (Wooldridge, 1999).11 It has been 
shown by Gourieroux et al. (1984) that because the Poisson model is in the linear exponential 
class, the Poisson coefficients estimates are consistent as long as the mean is correctly 
specified and that the robust standard errors are consistent even under misspecification of the 
distribution (Poisson Pseudo (or Quasi) Maximum Likelihood).  
For the second step of our analysis, the aim is to investigate the impact of the R&D 
collaboration on patent quality and the econometric model is like the one outlined above. The 
only difference is the outcome variable, which is no longer the count of filed patent 
applications by firm i in period t+1, but the count of the number of forward citations received 
in a 5-year window after the filing year per patent filed in t+1. 
Finally, the base line results will be contrasted to a series of extensions and robustness 
checks, taking potential endogeneity of collaboration into account, the fact that some firms do 
                                                 
10It should be noted that while the patent counts are non-negative integers, the number of forward citations per 
patent are not strictly speaking count data, as the values are not necessarily integers. However, Wooldridge 
(2002, p. 676) points out that the Poisson estimator is correct and still has all desirable properties as long as the 
conditional mean is correctly specified even when the dependent variable is not an actual count. 
11
 One solution could be the use of a negative binomial (negbin) model since it allows for overdispersion. Even 
though the negative binomial addresses the limitations of the Poisson model by allowing the mean and the 
variance to be different and by adding a parameter that reflects unobserved heterogeneity among observations, 
the negative binomial model estimates would be inconsistent and inefficient if the true distribution is not 
negative binomial (Gourieux et al., 1984). 
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both types of collaboration simultaneously as well as potential correlation between past and 
future patenting activities. With regards to potential remaining serial correlation, we perform 
a robustness check estimating Generalized Estimation Equation (GEE) population-averaged 
models allowing for an autoregressive correlation of order one. 
4.2 Data description 
Sample 
The data for our analysis stem from the Flemish part of the OECD R&D survey. The survey 
is harmonized across OECD countries and is conducted every second year in order to 
compose the OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators with the collected data. This 
R&D survey is a permanent inventory of all R&D-active companies in Flanders. The survey 
data is complemented with patent information from a database issued by the European Patent 
Office (EPO). The EPO/OECD patent citations database covers all patents applied for at the 
EPO since its foundation in 1978 as well as all patents applied for under the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in which the EPO is designated, so-called Euro-PCT applications. 
Information from the Belgian patent office is used to draw information about patents filed in 
Belgium only. Patent data is available as a time series from 1978 until the end of 2011. Our 
analysis covers the period from 2000 to 2009 and focuses only on manufacturing firms. The 
industries are classified between high-, medium, low tech and other manufacturing industries, 
following the OECD (2003) classification. The distribution of firms according to this 
classification in the sample is displayed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The final sample 
contains a total number of 4,013 observations from 1,278 different firms, resulting in an 
unbalanced panel. On average, each firm is observed 3.1 times (min = 2, max = 9) in the 
period of interest. 
 
Outcome variable 
The outcome variable PAT is measured as the count of patents filed by firm i in period t+1. 
This allows us to see if collaboration in R&D activities in period t, as well as the type of the 
collaboration, has an impact on patenting activities in period t+1. Our second dependent 
variable (AV_CITES) is measured as the count of forward citations per patent received in a 5-
year-window after the filing year. On average, firms in our sample apply for 0.5 patents a 
year. In the subsample of patent-active firms, the average is higher with 5 patents per year on 
average. In terms of forward citations, each patent filed by a firm in our sample gets on 
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average cited 0.11 times. For the subsample of patent-active firms, the average number of 
forward citations is of 1.3 times (see Table 1). 
 
R&D collaboration 
The central variables in our analysis are related to the collaboration pattern of the firms. First, 
from the survey we derive a dummy variable equal to one if a firm collaborates in its R&D 
activities (CO), irrespective of the purpose of the alliance. Second, the survey distinguishes the 
type of collaboration which allows us to account for heterogeneity in the objectives of the 
collaborative engagement.  
A collaboration may be set up to combine resources and abilities for a joint R&D 
project with the ambition to generate new knowledge. Such arrangements are covered by the 
dummy variable CO_JOINT that takes the value 1 if the firm reported that it was involved in 
such an agreement in the respective year. Another form of collaboration aims at the exchange 
of existing knowledge (CO_XCHANGE). Firms may be willing to reveal part of their 
technological know-how in exchange of access to that of the partner firm. Whereas the 
literature so far has focused on either R&D collaboration in general or on joint R&D, taking 
into account the knowledge exchange motive may add to the understanding of the effects on 
the firms’ patenting activities.  
As can be gathered from Table 1, the majority of firms in the sample rely on in-house 
R&D exclusively for developing new products and processes. Roughly a third of the firms 
are more outward-oriented and engage in R&D collaboration agreements in order to access 
external knowledge as well as to share the risks and costs of innovation with other 
organizations. Organizations with which firms can collaborate to implement joint R&D 
projects or to exchange pre-existing knowledge are numerous. Potential partners include 
competitors, customers, suppliers, universities, research institutes, and consultants. The 
majority of these collaborations of the firms composing our sample aim at joint R&D (24%) 
whereas slightly fewer, but still a considerable number of firms, engage in knowledge 
transfer collaborations (21%).  
 
Control variables 
Several control variables are included in our analyses. R&D is usually considered as the most 
important determinant for patent productivity. Hence we control for R&D input at the firm 
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level. To avoid confounding the effect of R&D spending with a mere size effect, the variable 
is measured as an intensity, namely the ratio of R&D employment to total employment (R&D). 
In line with previous research, we control for firm size (see e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001, Hall 
and Ziedonis, 2001, Somaya et al., 2007). Size is measured by the book value of the firms’ 
tangible assets (ASSETS). Previous studies have shown that due to the fixed cost linked to 
having and maintaining a legal department, there may be economies of scale in applying for 
patents. Likewise, companies with capital-intensive production might rely more heavily on 
innovation activities than labour-intensive firms, and hence be more likely to file patents. The 
capital intensity is measured as the ratio of fixed assets over the number of employees 
(KAPINT). Firm age is measured as the difference between the current year of observation and 
the founding year (AGE). In line with previous literature, age accounts for experience older 
firms might have in managing the patent application process, being therefore more efficient 
in their patenting activities for reasons that are not perfectly correlated to firm size (see e.g. 
Sorensen and Stuart, 2000).  
Given that the Poisson estimator has an exponential specification, we transform all our 
size-dependent independent variables as well as AGE into logarithms, ensuring that both 
dependent and independent variables are scaled in the same way. 
A group dummy (GROUP) controls for whether or not a firm is part of a group such as a 
multinational company or a holding company for instance. Being part of a group may involve 
more professional innovation management, especially when compared to small, stand-alone 
companies, which might have an impact on the success of R&D projects and the efficiency of 
patenting activities. 
The variables ln(prePat) and d_prePAT (as well as ln(preCIT) and d_preCIT) are included 
to control for the ‘fixed effect’ related to the firms’ unobserved propensity to patent. The 
variable ln(prePat) is the logged average number of patents in the 5 years prior the beginning 
of our panel and d_prePAT is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the pre-sample 
patent mean is equal to zero. Ln(preCIT) is measured as the average number of forward 
citations per patent in the 5 years prior the beginning of our panel received in a 5-year-
window after the patent was filed. The variable d_preCIT is a dummy variable that takes the 
value one if the pre-sample citation mean is equal to zero. Four industry dummy variables are 
constructed at the two-digit NACE-level to break up manufacturing firms into groups that are 
characterized by the basic nature of their technology and innovative patterns, to control for 
heterogeneity across classifications stemming from differences in technological 
opportunities. The used classification groups industries into high-, medium-,  low-tech and 
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‘other manufacturing’ follows the OECD classification (OECD, 2003). Finally, year 
dummies are included to capture macroeconomic shocks.  
Summary statistics of the main variables used in our models are displayed in Table 1.12 
The average firm of our sample exists since 28.4 years (median is 23), has tangible assets of 
the amount of € 1,781 million, and employs 6.6 R&D employees for every 100 total 
employees. This number is higher in the subsample of patent-active firms with an average of 
14 R&D employees for every 100 employees.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (4,013 obs., 1,278 firms) 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outcome variable 
PAT patent count 0.496 3.429 0 76 
AV_CITES citations per patent 0.113 0.998 0 27 
Control variables 
CO dummy 0.265 0.441 0 1 
CO_JOINT dummy 0.235 0.424 0 1 
CO_XCHANGE dummy 0.211 0.408 0 1 
ln(prePAT) pre-sample patents1995-1999 0.106 0.703 -1.609   6.002 
d_prePAT dummy (no pre sample patents) 0.847 0.360 0 1 
ln(preCIT) pre-sample citations1995-1999 0.176 0.795 -1.856   6.444 
d_preCIT dummy (no pre sample citations) 0.915 0.279 0 1 
GROUP dummy 0.584 0.493 0 1 
AGE years 28.425 19.655 1 126 
ln(ASSETS) tangible assets in million € 7.485 1.903 0.693 13.732 
ln(KAPINT) fixed assets / employees  3.293 1.026 0 6.381 
ln(R&D) R&D empl/ employees 0.059 0.101 0 0.693 
 
5. RESULTS 
The main results from the PSM Poisson models are reported in Table 2. Column one shows 
the estimates of the base model, where we analyse the impact of any type of collaboration on 
patenting activity (Model 1). Conform to expectations, we find a positive effect of 
collaboration in general (CO) on patent output, which confirms Hypothesis 1. As shown by the 
coefficient of collaboration, a collaborative firm in period t is 73% more likely to file an 
additional patent in period t+1 than a firm that did not undertake a collaboration for it’s R&D 
activities. When looking at the results of Model 2, distinguishing between firms involved in 
collaboration that aimed at joint knowledge creation and those aimed at knowledge exchange, 
it turns out that being engaged in exchange alliances has a positive effect on the number of 
                                                 
12
 Table A.2 in the Appendix shows cross correlations between the main variables used in the analysis. 
Table A.1 displays the variables for each industry group. 
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patents filed. Interestingly, for creation alliances, we do not find a statistically significant 
effect on patenting, although the sign of the coefficient is positive. Thus, we find no empirical 
support for Hypothesis 3 where we expected to find a larger effect of joint knowledge 
creation on patent applications. However, those findings confirm Hypothesis 5, implying that 
exchange collaborations may lead to patents filed for strategic reasons  like for instance 
patent portfolio considerations rather than by motives to protect an individual invention. As 
expected, the effect of ln(R&D) as a measure for direct input in the patent production function 
is positive and significant. The ‘fixed effect’ is also highly significant, pointing to the 
importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.  
Table 2: Pre-Sample Mean (PSM) Poisson Models (4,013 obs., 1,278 firms) 
Variables PATENT APPLICAITONSt+1 
(PAT) 
CITATIONS PER PATENT 
(AV_CITES) 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CO 0.739 ***   0.762 ***   
                    (0.218)       (0.249)       
CO_JOINT   0.166       0.961 *** 
   (0.283)       (0.323)     
CO_XCHANGE   0.545 **    -0.304     
   (0.250)       (0.308)     
ln(meanPAT) 0.662 *** 0.649 ***     
             (0.073)     (0.073)         
d_meanPAT -0.874 **  -0.923 ***     
  (0.346)     (0.342)         
ln(meanCIT)     0.185     0.185     
     (0.147)     (0.143)     
d_meanCIT     -1.621 *** -1.598 *** 
     (0.463)     (0.465)     
ln(R&D)      3.466 *** 3.549 *** 2.582     2.636     
                 (0.752)     (0.767)     (2.213)     (2.195)     
ln(AGE)         -0.146     -0.151     -0.409 **  -0.401 **  
 (0.120)     (0.119)     (0.178)     (0.174)     
ln(ASSETS) 0.354 *** 0.362 *** 0.493 *** 0.497 *** 
 (0.083)     (0.083)     (0.125)     (0.125)     
ln(KAPINT) 0.04     0.036     -0.194     -0.205     
  (0.145)     (0.144)     (0.210)     (0.206)     
GROUP    0.196     0.196     0.437     0.461  
 (0.339)     (0.340)     (0.537)     (0.535)  
Wald chi2(20) 2,770.86 ***  3123.18 *** 339.28 *** 439.78 *** 
Joint sign. of 
2
5.33  6.31 * 10.55 ** 9.92 ** 
Joint sign. of years 
2
66.86 *** 69.16  *** 19.68 ** 20.60 *** 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered, accounting for repeated observations at the firm level. All models contain a constant, 
industry and year dummies (not presented).  
With respect to patent quality, we find a statistically significant coefficient for overall 
collaboration (Model 3) confirming Hypothesis 2. In other words, patents filed by firms that 
undertake R&D activities in collaboration get more often cited as prior relevant art than 
patents that get filed by firms that do not collaborate for their R&D activities. Model 4 
distinguishes between creation and exchange alliances and finds opposite results from Model 
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2. In terms of patent quality, joint knowledge creation shows a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient. Thus, even though knowledge exchange in period t leads to more filed 
patents of the firms in period t+1, the patents filed by firms engaged in joint knowledge 
creation receive more forward citations. This confirms Hypothesis 4, hypotethizing that 
creation alliances trigger quality, as opposed to exchnage alliances triggering quantity rather 
then quality as suggested in Hypothesis 5. Hence, this ‘quantity-quality tradeoff’ shown by 
Models 2 and 4, is in line with the excpetations from Hypotheses 4 and 5.  
In Model 3 and 4, even though both, the coefficient of the pre-sample mean as well as 
the coefficient of ln(R&D) have the expected signs, neither one of them is statistically 
significant. This could be explained by the fact that contrary to patent history, forward 
citation history also largely depends on the importance attributed to a patented technology by 
other firms, and not solely be the patenting firm as is the case for patent history.13 Hence, the 
learning curve a firm goes through in terms of patent activities does not seem to follow a 
similar pattern in terms of forward citations. Similarly, while R&D is indispensible for 
patenting activity, forward citations also depend on the absorptive capacity of the citing 
firms, and hence on the R&D investment by the latter. Firm size is positive and significant in 
all models and age has no effect on the number of patents filed, but affects forward citations 
negatively. The latter result is in line with the idea that young firms drive the most radical 
technological advances.14 
 
6. EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS  
Before concluding we test the sensitivity of the results to critical features of the econometric 
models and underlying variables by carrying out a number of robustness checks.  
 
a) Controlling for recent patenting: the Exponential Feedback Model (EFM)  
So far neglected in our analysis is the argument that patenting activity in the recent past is an 
important determinant of current outcomes and could as a consequence cause serial 
corelation. As a consequnece, the omission of this recent patenting activity may bias the 
results. In order to account for such ‘feed forward effects’ on future patenting, we estimate a 
                                                 
13
 The dummy for firms that did not receive any citations prior the sample start is negative and significant as one 
would expect, capturing the fact that firms that got citations are qualitatively different from those that either 
never patented or patented, but never received any citations for these patents.  
14
 It should be noted that we experimented with non-linear specifications for firm size and firm age. The squared 
terms were, however, never statistically significant.  
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so-called exponential feedback model (EFM) using a pooled Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation method (see Blundell et al., 1995b). An alternative to the EFM would be the 
Linear Feedback Model (LFM, see Blundell et al., 2002). However, the LFM does better 
when the mean of Y is high and proportion of zeros small, whih is not the case with our data. 
Hence, given the large number of zeros in our dependent variable, especially in the number of 
forward citations, the EFM is more appropriate in our case (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p. 
806). The model can be written as 
,, = exp	, + , +                            (2) 
where PATi,t-1 enters as additional regressor in the exponential term. The model for the number 
of citations per patent is defined analogously. 
As shown in Table 3, our results hold if we allow for a one-year- lagged value of patent 
applications as additional regressor. Even though the significance of PATt-1 and AVCITESt-1 
illustrates the validity of this approach, the statistical significance of our main explanatory 
variables shows that our model does not lose its explanatory power due to the additional 
regressor. When comparing the results of the PSM model and the EFM (compare Tables 2 
and 3), we see that the coefficient of the lagged patent variable is very small, and that the 
main explanatory variables’ coefficient is close to the one of the main model. In terms of 
forward citations, the lagged variable’s coefficient is higher, and the coefficients of (the types 
of) collaboration, slightly smaller than in the main model.  
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Table 3: Exponential Feedback Model (EFM) with pre-sample mean (4,013 obs., 1,278 firms) 
Variables PATENT APPLICAITONSt+1 
(PAT) 
CITATIONS PER PATENT 
(AV_CITES) 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CO 0.797 ***   0.593 **    
                    (0.218)       (0.239)       
PATt-1 0.013 **  0.012 **      
 (0.005)     0.005      
AVCITESt-1     0.128 *** 0.128 *** 
     (0.013)     (0.013)     
CO_JOINT   0.243       0.843 **  
   (0.290)       (0.335)     
CO_XCHANGE   0.516 **    -0.369     
   (0.256)       (0.257)     
ln(meanPAT) 0.609 *** 0.6 ***    
             (0.072)     (0.072)         
d_meanPAT -0.933 *** -0.975 ***     
 (0.337)     (0.334)         
ln(meanCIT)     0.076     0.086     
     (0.100)     (0.100)     
d_meanCIT     -1.623 *** -1.584 *** 
     (0.382)     (0.394)     
ln(R&D) 3.285 *** 3.375 *** 1.795     1.886     
 (0.816)     (0.833)     (1.503)     (1.488)     
ln(AGE)         -0.155     -0.159     -0.378 **  -0.379 **  
 (0.113)     (0.113)     (0.153)     (0.149)     
ln(ASSETS) 0.321 *** 0.33 *** 0.487 *** 0.487 *** 
 (0.085)     (0.086)     (0.091)     (0.089)     
ln(KAPINT) 0.074     0.065     -0.17     -0.183     
  (0.132)     (0.133)     (0.172)     (0.170)     
GROUP         0.257     0.255     0.425     0.453     
                 (0.338)     (0.341)     (0.496)     (0.497)     
Wald chi2(20) 3,017.62 *** 3,175.07 *** 1,755.29 *** 1,683.83 *** 
Joint sign. of 
industries chi2(3) 5.70  6.63 * 10.28 ** 9.54 *** 
Joint sign. of years 
chi2(8) 68.39 *** 63.59 *** 25.51 *** 23.47 ** 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered, accounting for repeated observations at the firm level. All models contain a constant, 
industry and year dummies (not presented).  
 
 
b) Controlling for joint adoption of collaboration strategies  
Given that a considerable amount of firms in our sample undertake both types of 
collaboration simultaneously, we want to check whether our findings are confirmed if we i) 
drop the firms that are engaged in both types of collaboration simultaneously from our 
sample and ii) explicitly test for the effect of joint adoption of both types of collaboration on 
patent productivity. More precisely, we want to see how robust our results are to the 
significant positive correlation between our key variables of interest (CO_JOINT, 
CO_XCHANGE).15  
                                                 
15
 See Table A.2. 
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For that purpose of testing i) we drop all firms that were engaged in both types and 
perform the models on the remaining 3,283 observations. Dropping these firms naturally 
results in an insignificant correlation between the two variables CO_JOINT and CO_XCHANGE. 
As can be gathered from Table 4, the main findings remain unchanged. As expected, the 
coefficient of collaboration (Model 1) remains statistically significant. With regards to the 
type of collaboration a firm is involved in, we find, in line with our previous findings, that 
knowledge exchange alliances have a significant positive effect on the number of patent 
applications (Model 2). Compared to our previous results where we did not find a significant 
effect of knowledge creation alliances on patent application, when using only the sub-sample 
of firms that engage in either one type of collaboration, we find that creation alliances have as 
well a positive impact on patent activity. The size of the coefficient of the latter, however, is 
substantially smaller, i.e. half the size of the coefficient of knowledge exchange alliances, 
confirming the previous results.  
With regards to patent quality, we find, like for the full sample, that patents filed by 
firms engaged in any type of collaboration get significantly more forward citations per patent 
compared to firms that are not engaged in collaboration for their R&D activities (Model 3). 
Similarly, we find that patents filed by firms engaged in creation alliances receive 
significantly more forward citations than patents filed by firms that are engaged in exchange 
alliances (Model 4). 
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Table 4: Pre-Sample Mean (PSM) Poisson Models, excluding firms that do both types of cooperation (models 1-4) and excluding non-collaborators (models 5-6) 
Variables PATENT APPLICAITONSt+1 (PAT) CITATIONS PER PATENTt+1 (AV_CITES) 
PATENT 
APPLICAITONSt+1 
(PAT) 
CITATIONS PER 
PATENTt+1 
(AV_CITES) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
CO 0.628 **  
  
1.027 *** 
    
                    (0.246     
  
(0.339)     
    CO_JOINT 
  
0.440 **  
  
1.144 *** 0.059 
 
0.591 * 
   
(0.223)     
  
(0.387)     (0.271) 
 
(0.349) 
 CO_XCHANGE 
  
1.336 *** 
  
0.504     0.456 ** -0.274 
 
   
(0.446)     
  
(0.627)     (0.229) 
 
(0.309) 
 ln(meanPAT) 0.616 *** 0.601 *** 
    
0.609 *** 
 
             (0.100)     (0.104)     
    
(0.076) 
  d_meanPAT -1.331 *** -1.421 *** 
    
-0.820 ** 
 
  (0.332)     (0.325)     
    
(0.386) 
  ln(meanCIT) 
    
0.099     0.099     
 
0.170 
 
     
(0.095)     (0.098)     
 
(0.158) 
 d_meanCIT 
    
-1.594 *** -1.548 *** 
 
-1.748 *** 
     
(0.456)     (0.475)     
 
(0.546) 
 ln(R&D) 3.836 *** 3.824 *** 0.644     0.479     2.081 *** 4.157 ** 
 
(0.890)     (0.763)     (1.845)     (1.968)     (0.794) 
 
(1.835) 
 ln(AGE)         -0.522 **  -0.538 **  -0.553 *** -0.554 *** -0.080 
 
-0.542 *** 
 
(0.213)     (0.217)     (0.171)     (0.170)     (0.134) 
 
(0.208) 
 ln(ASSETS) 0.431 *** 0.459 *** 0.594 *** 0.575 *** 0.261 *** 0.610 *** 
                  (0.098)     (0.101)     (0.106)     (0.115)     (0.079) 
 
(0.165) 
 ln(KAPINT) -0.308 **  -0.308 **  -0.222     -0.220     0.123 
 
-0.299 
 
  (0.133)     (0.124)     (0.191)     (0.194)     (0.172) 
 
(0.291) 
 GROUP         -0.168     -0.202     0.077     0.115     0.418 
 
0.482 
 
                 (0.392)     (0.393)     (0.588)     (0.607)     (0.475)   (0.575)   
Wald chi2(20) 3,697.91 *** 4,016.18 *** 386.41 *** 398.87 *** 2102.51 *** 230.31 *** 
Joint sign. of industries 
chi2(3) 5.32  5.86  10.85 ** 9.81 ** 16.47 *** 6.47 * 
Joint sign. of years chi2(8) 8.49 
 
9.34 
 
12.90 
 
14.11 * 79.22 *** 13.77 * 
# observations 3,283 of 1,184 firms 3,283 of 1,184 firms 3,283 of 1,184 firms 3,283 of 1,184 firms 1,599 of 357 firms 1,599 of 357 firms 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered, accounting for repeated observations at the firm level. All 
models contain a constant, industry and year dummies (not presented).  
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Next, we perform a robustness test as described in ii) and test on the full sample of 4,013 
observations whether the joint adoption of both collaboration strategies has an added value 
compared to doing only one. For this purpose, we estimated the models as in equation (1), but 
additionally include a set of dummy variables for the different strategy combinations: 
XCHANGE_only (1 0), JOINT_only, (0 1) NEITHER (0 0), and BOTH (1 1). Table 5 presents the main 
results from these estimations.16 The results show that for the number of patent applications 
in t+1, any collaboration strategy has a significant positive impact compared to not 
collaborating. In line with previous results, CO_JOINT alone (0 1) has a signficantly smaller 
effect than CO_XCHANGE alone (1 0). Being engaged in both types of collaboration (1 1), 
however, does not lead to more patent applications than CO_XCHANGE alone, i.e. the z-test of 
(1 1) - (1 0) > 0 is rejected. Hence, we can conclude that there is no complementarity between 
both types of collaboration. 
For the number of forward citations per patent, we find in line with our previous results, 
that joint R&D alone (CO_JOINT) leads to more forawd citations than CO_XCHANGE alone. 
Firms engaged in both types of collaborations, again, do receive more citations per patent 
than non-collaborating firms, but not more than those solely engaged in CO_JOINT. Thus, the 
previous results are robust to the inclusion of the effect from joint adoption of both 
collaboration strategies and additionally reject the presumption that the two forms of 
collaboration are strategic complements. 
Table 5: Pre-Sample Mean (PSM) Poisson Models (4,013 obs., 1,278 firms) with joint 
engagement in both alliance types 
Variables 
[CO_XCHANGE; 
CO-JOINT] 
PATENT APPLICAITONS 
(PAT) 
CITATIONS PER PATENT 
(AV_CITES) 
0 1 0.564**    (0.236)       0.991*** (0.349) 
1 0  1.307 **   (0.515) 0.518 (0.619) 
1 1  0.851 ***  (0.229)     0.647** (0.266) 
0 0      reference category                    reference category 
Wald chi2(21)   3,224.12***  498.65*** 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered, accounting for repeated observations at the firm level. All 
models contain a constant, industry, year dummies, and the set of control variables  (not 
presented) as specified in the models presented in Table 2.  
 
c) Effects of the type of collaboration conditional on involvement in an R&D alliance 
So far, the sample contained firms engaged in a collaboration as well as firms that had never 
collaborated. Thus, we estimated average effects of collaborating firms compared to non 
                                                 
16
 The full estimation results from this exercise are available on request from the authors. 
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collaborating firms. Now, we test if our key insights hold if we consider only firms that were 
enaged at least once in an R&D alliance during the period under review and thus test whether 
conditional on collaborating, the two different types of collaboration differ in their effect on 
patent quantity and quality. Deleting non-collaborators from our sample reduced the number 
of observations to 1,599 units, corresponding to 357 different firms. Models 5 and 6 of Table 
4 present the results. The results on the number of patent applications are in line with the ones 
on the full sample presented in Table 2. On the number of citations per patent the effect of 
CO_JOINT is less pronounced as before, but still positive and significant at the 10% level. 
Thus, the insights reagrding the types of collaboration are confirmed in the subsample of 
collaborating firms.  
d) Controlling for potential endogeneity 
R&D collaboration is a potential source of endogeneity in our model, as firms’ patenting 
activities and their collaboration strategies may depend on some common unobservable firm-
specific factors, like for example innovation strategies in place to optimize a firm’s patenting 
portfolio17. Similarly, one could argue that a firm chooses its collaborators ex-ante, based for 
instance on the patent stock of their potential R&D partner which signals the technological 
interest of the latter and hence provides firms with incentives to patent. In this case, the 
causality would go from patents to collaborations and not vice-versa. Thus, although we used 
a lead of the dependent variable that rules out direct simultaneity, we want to test whether 
endogeneity is driving our positive results from collaboration on patenting. To do so, we 
conduct instrumental variable (IV) regressions. For reasons of comparison, we present the 
results from an OLS IV regression where the dependent variable is defined as log(PAT+1) and 
log(AV_CITES+1), respectively. We further performed IV Poisson regressions estimate by 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM).18  
For the purpose of the IV regressions, we construct four instrumental variables that are 
correlated to the potentially endogenous variable of collaboration, but rather exogenous to 
patenting activity. The first instrument (PC_COOP), is defined as the share of collaborating 
firms belonging to the same region (based on a 2-digit zip code) and the same industry (based 
on a 2-digit NACE code). Hence, this instrument captures the collaboration potential of firms 
in the same region belonging to the same industry. The more potential collaboration partners 
                                                 
17
 Indeed, as shown by Hall and Ziedonis (2001), many firms set precise goals of the number of patents they 
want to apply for in a given year. In line with these goals, the number of patent applications filed by firms has 
risen considerably over the last 2 decades. However, this increased volume of patent applications appears to 
reflect a deeper reach into the existing pool of inventions rather than a shift in R&D activities per se.  
18
 See Windmijer and Santos Silva (1997) for technical details. 
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available within geographic proximity and active in a technology directly related to a firm i’s 
main activity (see e.g. Autant-Bernard et al., 2007 for an overview), the higher the 
probability that the given firm engages in a collaborative agreement. Our second instrument 
(YEXP), captures the number of years of experience a firm has in R&D collaboration (YEXP ∈ 
(0,9)). Indeed, a firm that has collaborated in the past is more likely to collaborate in the 
future.  
The third instrument is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm qualifies as a small or 
medium-sized firm (SME). The first reason for the inclusion of this dummy relates to the 
nature of R&D activities. Since R&D often exhibits economies of scale, it might well be that 
only a consortium of firms has the necessary resources, both financially and physically, to 
undertake larger, more complex and more expensive research projects that are common 
nowadays. This is particularly true for SMEs. The second reason relates to the incentive to 
collaborate in light of receiving a potential subsidy form the Flemish Innovation Agency (the 
IWT). Indeed, while the IWT attributes subsidies to collaborators as well as to non-
collaborators, the former get an additional 10% of the total cost of an R&D project covered, 
provided that at least one partner is an SME. Hence, given that for the same cost of applying 
for a grant an SME can receive an additional 10% covered if it collaborates in its R&D 
activities, this might encourage small and medium sized firms to enter R&D collaborations. 
Finally, given that we do not restrict our analysis to inter-firm collaboration but that we also 
have industry-science collaborators in our sample, we create a fourth instrument, being a 
dummy variable equal to one if a firm is located close to a university, based on a 2-digit zip 
code level (UNICLOSE). Being located close to a university may increase the propensity to 
collaborate, but has no direct effect on patenting. 
Even though, admittedly, those instruments might not be the most powerful ones for our 
case, it has to be born in mind that it is a serious challenge to find instruments in the case of 
collaboration and patenting, because many variables affect both activities at least to some 
extent. Hence, although the instruments might not be ideal, the economic intuition behind the 
chosen instruments is valid and they are supported by the statistical test (the Hansen J test 
rejects over identification at the 1% level). As a consequence, the IV regressions provid a 
valid robustness check.19 As shown by Table 6, the results from the IV models show that the 
                                                 
19
 The criteria commonly used for evaluating the validity of instruments are not appropriate for IV Poisson 
estimation. As suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) as rule of thumb, the partial F-statistic for the excluded 
instruments should be larger than 10 to ensure that instruments are not weak. The F-statistic exceeds 10 for both 
specifications of the OLS MODEL, see Table 6). However, it should be kept in mind that we should have 
estimated a binary response model at the first stage. For IV Poisson model no such rule of thumb exists, 
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positive effect of collaboration on patents and forwards citations do not alter when we control 
for potential endogeneity. Model 1 and 2 report the results from an ordinary IV OLS 
regression, and Model 3 and 4 from the IV Poisson regression estimated by Generalized 
Methods of Moments (GMM). 
 
Table 6: IV regressions controlling for potential endogeneity (2nd stage results; 4,013 obs., 
1,278 firms) 
 
OLS IV IV POISSON 
Variables ln(1+PAT) ln(1+AV_CITES) PAT AV_CITES 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CO 0.106 *   0.100 *** 0.771 **  1.632 **  
                    (0.054)     (0.035)     (0.393)     (0.767)     
ln(meanPAT) 0.391 ***   0.663 ***  
             (0.038)       (0.070)       
d_meanPAT -0.194 ***  -0.666 **    
  (0.040)       (0.308)       
ln(meanCIT)   0.041       0.156  
   (0.045)       (0.111)  
d_meanCIT   -0.114       -1.476 *** 
   (0.078)       (0.436)     
ln(R&D) 0.233 *   -0.102     3.410 *** 2.086     
 (0.128)     (0.070)     (0.715)     (1.514)     
ln(AGE)         -0.027     -0.007     -0.187     -0.449 *** 
 (0.020)     (0.008)     (0.116)     (0.173)     
ln(ASSETS) -0.019 **  -0.006     0.380 *** 0.450 *** 
 (0.009)     (0.006)     (0.074)     (0.088)     
ln(KAPINT) 0.032 *** 0.014 *** 0.018  -0.148     
  (0.007)     (0.004)     (0.123)  (0.183)     
GROUP         -0.026 **  -0.010     0.326     0.418  
                 (0.013)     (0.009)     (0.337)     (0.470)   
Test of excluded 
instruments (1st stage) F = 317.57 F = 329.52     
Hansen J overid. test 
chi2(3) 0.968  0.969  0.925  0.922  
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by firm. The models contain a constant, industry and year dummies 
(not presented).  
 
e)  ‘Population-Averaged’ Poisson Models with pre-sample mean 
The Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) approach adopts the exponential mean 
regression form given in equation (1) with assumed serial correlation structure. Pioneered by 
Liang and Zeger (1986), this ‘population-averaged’ approach and has been used in a broad 
range of count data models (see e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Somaya et al., 2007). The GEE 
method of modeling panel data is an extension of Nelder and Wedderburn's (1972) and 
                                                                                                                                                        
therefore we refrain from reporting Wald test statistics on the joint significance of the excluded instruments in 
the first stage, where the excluded variables were significant at the 1% level. Windmeijer and Santos Silva 
(1997) remark that validity of the IVs can at least partially be settled by using the test of overidentifying 
restrictions. 
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McCullagh and Nelder's (1983) Generalized Linear Models (GLIM) approach to 
specification.  Similar to Somaya at al. (2007), we check the robustness of our findings by re-
estimating our model by the GEE technique, using a Poisson specification and a AR(1) 
correlation structure, i.e. Corr[εit, εis]  =  ρ|t-s| , t ≠ s. As can be seen in the results reported in 
Table 7, our previous findings are confirmed.  
 
Table 7: GEE Poisson models with pre-sample mean (4,013 obs., 1,278 firms) 
Variables PATENT APPLICAITONSt+1 
(PAT) 
CITATIONS PER 
PATENTt+1 (AV_CITES) 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CO 0.311 **    0.746 ***   
                    (0.157)       (0.243)       
CO_JOINT   -0.130       0.888 *** 
   (0.182)       (0.342)     
CO_XCHANGE   0.448 **    -0.243     
   (0.187)       (0.302)     
ln(meanPAT) 0.678 *** 0.671 ***     
             (0.067)     (0.067)         
d_meanPAT -1.266 *** -1.323 ***     
  (0.333)     (0.324)         
ln(meanCIT)     0.173     0.173     
     (0.139)     (0.135)     
d_meanCIT     -1.684 *** -1.672 *** 
     (0.441)     (0.444)     
ln(R&D) 1.977 *** 1.945 *** 2.655     2.700     
 (0.638)     (0.617)     (1.880)     (1.870)     
ln(AGE)         -0.116    -0.124     -0.405 **  -0.398 **  
 (0.114)     (0.111)     (0.165)     (0.160)     
ln(ASSETS) 0.324 *** 0.331 *** 0.500 *** 0.502 *** 
 (0.070)     (0.069)     (0.114)     (0.114)     
ln(KAPINT) 0.024     0.032     -0.219     -0.225     
  (0.127)     (0.125)     (0.194)     (0.193)     
GROUP         0.062    0.036     0.434     0.458     
                 (0.324)    (0.329)     (0.522)     (0.522)     
Wald chi2(20) 2,984.98 *** 3,213.80 *** 406.17 *** 509.17 *** 
Joint sign. of 
industries chi2(3) 5.21  5.59  12.87 *** 11.72 *** 
Joint sign. of years 
chi2(8) 98.73 *** 101.58 *** 16.35 ** 17.08 ** 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered and AR1 corrected. All models contain a constant, industry and 
year dummies (not presented).  
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7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The intention of this paper was to study the effects of R&D collaboration on patent activity. 
Whereas our findings confirm previous works by suggesting a positive relationship between 
collaboration and patents, they add to that literature by distinguishing between the type of 
collaborations and by considering quantity as well as quality. In particular, the results shed 
light on the effects of knowledge exchange collaboration may have on patenting activity as 
opposed to joint R&D and how those effects differ when comparing patent quantity and 
patent quality. 
Using a Poisson estimation accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity to 
patent, we find that knowledge exchange alliances have a significant positive impact on the 
number of patents filed, but not on the number of forward citations received. Joint R&D, on 
the other, does have a positive significant impact on forward citations received, hence on 
patent quality. These findings are robust to a series of robustness checks. In line with recent 
literature on strategic patenting, these results may indicate that patenting of collaborating 
firms is not only used as a mere tool to protect intellectual property rights, but also as a 
strategic tool to construct firms’ patenting portfolios. In other words, joint R&D may provide 
incentives to file patents that are indeed aimed at protecting valuable inventions from 
imitation by others, while exchange alliances drive ‘portfolio patenting’ which has been 
shown to result in fewer citations for the individual patent. 
Indeed, as stated by Hall and Ziedonis (2001), in times of fast changing technology where 
firms advance quickly upon innovations made by others, strategic patenting in the aim of 
building a larger portfolio of the firm’s ‘right to exclude’ may not only help reduce the 
holdup problem posed by external patent owners, but might also allow firms to negotiate 
access to external technology more favourably. As such, our study allows showing the 
multifaceted effects of and uses made by patent strategies at the firm level.  
Whereas our study sheds light on the link between collaboration alliances and incentives to 
patent, it leaves open questions related to the social impacts of these results. As shown, R&D 
collaboration does lead to more patents, but whether these are also valuable depends on the 
purpose of the collaboration alliance. Strategic patenting resulting in patent portfolio races 
yielding more, but less valuable patents, could have detrimental effects on social welfare if it 
comes at the cost of socially valuable knowledge creation and diffusion.  
On similar grounds, it would be intersting for future research to take into account the impact 
of exchange and creation alliances on product market output and firm performance. Indeed, 
  
28 
 
while the current analysis allows us to draw conclusions with respect to firms’ technological 
development, which, according to Mansfield (1986) indicates the first stage of successful 
innovation, we cannot draw conclusions of what he calls the second stage, namely, successful 
commercialisation. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to compare the impact of these types 
of collaboration, differentiating between national and foreign partners. Indeed, while the 
knowledge pool accessible to a firm might be larger for firms that have foreign collaborating 
partners, transaction costs of such collaborations may be higher and ineffective protection for 
firms seeking to protect technology transferred across national borders might not only affect 
firms’ incentives to engage in such types of collaboration but also influence the firms’ 
patenting activities. Finally, it would be interesting to investigate if, and to which extent, 
R&D policies such as direct subsidies for R&D collaboration, for instance, play a role in 
driving either kind of collaborative activity as well as the effects on patenting both in terms of 
quality and quantity.    
  
29 
 
REFERENCES  
Ahuja G, Katila R. 2001. Technology Acquisitions and the Innovation Performance of 
Acquiring Firms: a Longitudinal Study. Strategic Management Journal 22(3): 197-220.  
Albert MB, Avery, D, Narin, F, McAllister, P. 1991. Direct Validation of Citation Counts as 
Indicators of Industrially Important Patents. Research Policy 20(3): 251–259. 
Arundel A. 2001. The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy for Appropriation. 
Research Policy 30: 611-624. 
Arundel A, Patel P. 2003. Strategic Patenting, Background Report for the Trend Chart Policy 
Benchmarking Workshop "New Trends in IPR Policy". 
Autant-Bernard C, Mairesse J, Massard N. 2007. Spatial Knowledge Diffusion Through 
Collaborative Networks. Papers in Regional Science 86(3): 341-350. 
Belderbos, R, Carree M, Diederen B, Lokshin B, Veugelers R. 2004a. Heterogeneity in R&D 
Cooperation Strategies. International Journal of Industrial Organization 8/9: 1237–
1264. 
Belderbos R, Carree M, Lokshin B. 2004b. Cooperative R&D and Firm Performance. 
Research Policy 33(10): 1477–1492. 
Branstetter LG, Sakakibara M. 2002. When Do Research Consortia Work Well and Why? 
Evidence from Japanese Panel Data. The American Economic Review 92(1): 143-159. 
Brouwer E, Kleinknecht A. 1999.  Innovative Output, and a Firm’s Propensity to Patent. An 
Exploration of CIS Micro Data. Research Policy 28: 615–624. 
Blind K, Edler J, Frietsch R, Schmoch U. (2006), Motives to Patent: Empirical Evidence 
from Germany. Research Policy 35: 655-672. 
Blind K, Cremers K, Müller E. 2009. The Influence of Strategic Patenting on Companies' 
Patent Portfolios. Research Policy 38(2): 428-436. 
Blundell R, Griffith R, Van Reenen J. 1995. Dynamic Count Data Models of Technological 
Innovation. The Economic Journal, 105(429): 333-344. 
Blundell R, Griffith R, Windmijer F. 1995b. Dynamics and Correlated Responses in 
Longitudinal Data Models. In: Statistical Modeling: Proceedings of the 10th 
International Workshop on Statistical Modeling, Seeber, G.U.H., Francis, B.J., 
Hatzinger, R. and Steckel-Berger, G. (eds.), 35-42. 
Blundell R, Griffith R, Van Reenen J. 2002. Individual Effects and Dynamics in Count Data 
Models. Journal of Econometrics 108: 113-131. 
Caloghirou Y,  Vonortas N, Ioannides S. 2003. Research Joint Ventures. Journal of 
Economic Surveys 17(4): 541-570. 
Cameron A.C, Trivedi P.K. 1998. Regression Analysis of Count Data. Econometric Society 
Monograph No.30, Cambridge University Press. 
Cameron AC, Trivedi PK. 2005. Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. Cambridge 
UK, Cambridge University Press. 
Cohen WM, Goto A, Nagata A, Nelson RR, Walsh JP. 2002. R&D Spillovers, Patents and 
the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United States.  Research Policy 31: 1349-
1367. 
  
30 
 
Czarnitzki D,  Fier A. 2003. Publicly Funded R&D Collaborations and Patent Outcome in 
Germany. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 03-24. Available at: 
http://www.zew.de/de/publikationen/publikation.php3?action=detail&art=12&nr=1854 
Czarnitzki D, Ebersberger B, Fier A. 2006. The Relationship Between R&D Collaboration, 
Subsidies and Patenting Activity: Empirical Evidence from Finland and Germany. 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 22: 1347-1366. 
d’Aspremont C, Jacquemin A. 1988. Cooperative and Non-cooperative R&D in Duopoly 
with Spillovers. American Economic Review 78(5): 1133-1137. 
Deeds D, Hill C. 1996. Strategic Alliances and the Rate of new Product Development. 
Journal of Business Venturing 11: 41-55.   
Eisenhardt KM, Schoonhoven CB. 1996. Resource-based View of Strategic Alliance 
Formation: Strategic and Social Explanations in Entrepreneurial Firms. Organization 
Science 7(2): 136-150.  
Faems D, Van Looy B, Debackere K. 2005. The Role of Inter-Organizational Collaboration 
within Innovation Strategies: Towards a Portfolio Approach. Journal of Product 
Innovation Management 22(3): 238-250. 
Griliches Z. 1984. R&D, Patents and Productivity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Griliches Z. 1990. Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: a Survey. Journal of Economic 
Literature 28: 1661-1707. 
Gnyawali DR, Park B-J. 2011. Co-opetition Between Giants: Collaboration with Competitors 
for Technological Innovation. Research Policy 40: 650-663.  
Gomes-Casseres B, Hagedoorn J, Jaffe A. 2006. Do Alliances Promote Knowledge Flows. 
Journal of Financial Economics 80: 5-33. 
Gourieroux C, Monfort A, Trognon A. 1984. Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods: 
Applications to Poisson models. Econometrica 52(3): 701-720. 
Gulati R. 1998. Alliances and networks. Strategic Management Journal 19, 293–317. 
Hall BH, Ziedonis RH. 2001. The Patent Paradox Revisited: an Empirical Study of Patenting 
in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry 1979-1995. RAND Journal of Economics 32(1): 
101-128.   
Hall BH, Jaffe A, Trajtenberg M. 2005. Market Value and Patent Citations. RAND Journal of 
Economics 36(1): 16-38. 
Hamel G. 1991. Competition for Competence and Inter-partner Learning Within International 
Strategic Alliances. Strategic Management Journal 12: 83-103. 
Hagedoorn J. 1993. Understanding the Rational of Strategic Technology Partnering: Inter-
organizational Modes of Cooperation and Sectoral Differences. Strategic Management 
Journal 14(5): 371-385. 
Hagedoorn J, Schakenraad J. 1994. The Effect of Strategic Technology Alliances on 
Company Performance. Strategic Management Journal 15(4): 291-311. 
Hagedoorn J, Link AN, Vonortas NS. 2000. Research Partnerships. Research Policy 29(4–5): 
567-586. 
Harabi N. 1995. Appropriability of Technical Innovations: An Empirical analysis. Research 
Policy 24: 981-992. 
  
31 
 
Harhoff D, Narin E, Scherer EM, Vopel K. 1999. Citation Frequency and the Value of 
Patented Inventions. Review of Economics and Statistics 81: 511-515. 
Harhoff D, Scherer FM, Vopel K. 2003. Citations, Family Size, Opposition and the Value of 
Patent Rights. Research Policy 33: 1343-1363. 
Henderson R, Cockburn I. 1996. Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The Determinants of Research 
Productivity in Drug Discovery. The RAND Journal of Economics 27(1): 32-59. 
Hoang H, Rothaermel FT. 2010. Leveraging Internal And External Experience: Exploration, 
Exploitation. Strategic Management Journal 31: 734–758. 
Janz N, Peters B, Lööf H. 2004. Firm Level Innovation and Productivity, Is there a Common 
Story Across Countries?. Problems and Perspectives in Management 2: 184-204. 
Jones B. 2009. The Burden of Knowledge and the ‘Death of the Renaissance Man’: Is 
Innovation Getting Harder?. Review of Economic Studies 76(1): 283-317. 
Katila R. 2001. Using Patent Data to Measure Innovation Performance. In: Neely, A. (ed.), 
Business Performance Measurement: Theory and Practice, 304-312, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridgre, UK.  
Katz ML. 1986. An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development. RAND Journal of 
Economics 17(4): 527-543. 
Klomp L, van Leeuwen G. 2001. Linking Innovation and Firm Performance: A New 
Approach. International Journal of the Economics of Business 8(3): 343–364. 
Lanjouw JO, Schankerman M. 2004. Patent Quality and Research Productivity: Measuring 
Innovation with Multiple Indicators. Economic Journal 114: 441-465. 
Leahy D, Neary P. 1997. Public Policy Towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries. The 
American Economic Review 87(4): 642–662. 
Liang K, Zeger S. 1986. Longitudinal Data Analysis Using Generalized Linear Models. 
Biometrika 73: 13-22. 
Lööf H, Heshmati A. 2002. Knowledge Capital and Performance Heterogeneity: A Firm-
level Innovation Study. International Journal of Production Economics 76(1): 61–85. 
Mansfiel E. 1986. Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study. Management Science 32(2): 
173-181. 
McCullagh P, Nelder J. 1983. Generalized Linear Models. Chapman and Hall, New York. 
Mody A. 1993. Learning Through Alliances. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 20: 151–170. 
Mowery DC, Oxley JE, Silverman BS. 1996. Strategic Alliances and Inter-firm Knowledge 
Transfer. Strategic Management Journal 17: 77-91. 
Nelder J, Wedderburn R. 1972. Generalized Linear Models. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society Series A 135: 370-384. 
Noel N, Schankerman M. 2006. Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation. CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 5701. 
OECD. 2003. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2003. OECD Publishing: 
Paris.  
  
32 
 
Pakes A, Griliches Z. 1984. Estimating Distributed Lags in Short Panels with an Application 
to the Specification of Depreciation Patterns and Capital Stock Constructs. Review of 
Economic Studies 51(2): 243-262. 
Peeters C, van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie B. 2006.  Innovation Strategy and the Patenting 
Behavior of Firms. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 16: 109–135.  
Penner-Hahn J, Shaver JM 2005. Does International Research and Development Increase 
Patent Output? An Analysis of Japanese Pharmaceutical Firms. Strategic Management 
Journal 26(2): 121–140. 
Powell WW, Koput KW, Smith-Doerr L. 1996. Interorganizational Collaboration and the 
Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 41(1): 116–144. 
Sampson RC. 2005. R&D Alliances and Firm Performance: the Impact of Technological 
Diversity and Alliance Organization on Innovation. Academy of Management Journal 
50: 364–386. 
Schilling M, Phelps C. 2007. Interfirm Collaboration Networks: The Impact of Large-Scale 
Network Structure on Firm Innovation. Management Science 53(7): 1113–1126. 
Somaya D, Williamson IO, Zhang X. 2007. Combining Patent Law Expertise with R&D for 
Patenting Performance. Organization Science 18(6): 922–937. 
Sorensen JB, Stuart TE. 2000. Aging, Obsolescence, and Organizational Innovation. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 45(1): 81 - 112.  
Staiger D, Stock J. 1997. Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments. 
Econometrica 65(3): 557–586. 
Stuart TE. 2000. Interorganizational Alliances and the Performance of Firms: A Study of 
Growth and Innovation Rates in a Hightechnology Industry. Strategic Management 
Journal 21: 791–811.  
Thumm N. 2004. Strategic Patenting in Biotechnology. Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management 16(4): 529–538. 
Traijtenberg M. 1990. A Penny for your Quotes. Patent Citations and the Value of 
Innovation. RAND Journal of Economics 21(1): 172-187. 
Vanhaverbeke W, Beerkens B, Duysters G. 2007. Technological Capability Building 
Through Networking Strategies Within High-Tech Industries. UNU-Merit Working 
Paper 2007-018. Available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/dgr/unumer/2007018.html 
Van Leeuwen G. 2002. Linking Innovation to Productivity Growth Using Two Waves of the 
Community Innovation Survey. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working 
Papers, 2002/08, OECD Publishing. 
Van Ophem H, Brouwer E, Kleinknecht A, Mohnen P. 2001. The Mutual Relation Between 
Patents and R&D. In: Kleinknecht, A., Mohnen, P. (eds), Innovation and Firm 
Performance: Econometric Explorations of Survey Data, Palgrave, New York. 
Walker R. 1995. Patents as Scientific and Technical Literature. Scarecrow Press: Lanham, 
MD.  
Windmeijer F, Santos Silva J.M.C. 1997. Endogeneity in Count Data Models: An 
Application to Demand for Health Care. Journal of Applied Econometrics 12: 281–294. 
  
33 
 
Wooldridge J.M. 1999. Distribution-Free Estimation of Some Nonlinar Panel Data Models, 
Journal of Econometrics 90: 77–97. 
Wooldridge J.M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT Press: 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
  
34 
 
APPENDIX: 
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics by industry classification (4,013 obs.) 
      
Low-tech industries (1,682 obs.) 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outcome variable 
PAT patent count 0.304 2.853 0 67 
AV_CITES citations per patent 0.106 1.093 0 27 
Control variables 
CO dummy 0.265 0.441 0 1 
CO_JOINT dummy 0.231 0.422 0 1 
CO_XCHANGE dummy 0.219 0.414 0 1 
ln(prePAT) pre-sample patents1995-1999 0.068 0.468 -1.609 2.128 
d_prePAT dummy (no pre sample patents) 0.900 0.300 0 1 
ln(preCIT) pre-sample citations1995-1999 0.111 0.653 -.8754 4.277 
d_preCIT dummy (no pre sample citations) 0.944 0.231 0 1 
GROUP dummy 0.598 0.491 0 1 
AGE years 29.205 18.800 1 108 
ln(ASSETS) tangible assets in million € 7.689 1.866 1.098 11.343 
ln(KAPINT) fixed assets / employees  3.474 1.031 0.066 6.305 
ln(R&D) R&D employees/ employees 0.034 0.061 0 0.693 
Medium-tech industries (1,679 obs.) 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outcome variable 
PAT patent count 0.491 2.807 0 41 
AV_CITES citations per patent 0.090 0.525 0 6 
Control variables 
CO dummy 0.256 0.437 0 1 
CO_JOINT dummy 0.225 0.418 0 1 
CO_XCHANGE dummy 0.194 0.395 0 1 
ln(prePAT) pre-sample patents1995-1999 0.115 0.776 -1.609 5.276 
d_prePAT dummy (no pre sample patents) 0.794 0.405 0 1 
ln(preCIT) pre-sample citations1995-1999 0.214 0.831 -1.238 5.207 
d_preCIT dummy (no pre sample citations) 0.886 0.318 0 1 
GROUP dummy 0.572 0.495 0 1 
AGE years 28.718 19.909 1 119 
ln(ASSETS) tangible assets in million € 7.420 1.831 0.693 13.004 
ln(KAPINT) fixed assets / employees  3.195 0.957 0 6.244 
ln(R&D) R&D employees/ employees 0.059 0.085 0 0.693 
 
High-tech industries (322 obs.) 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outcome variable 
PAT patent count 1.991 7.770 0 76 
AV_CITES citations per patent 0.375 2.162 0 25 
Control variables 
CO dummy 0.481 0.500 0 1 
CO_JOINT dummy 0.460 0.499 0 1 
CO_XCHANGE dummy 0.391 0.489 0 1 
ln(prePAT) pre-sample patents1995-1999 0.381 1.302 -1.609 6.002 
d_prePAT dummy (no pre sample patents) 0.733 0.443 0 1 
ln(preCIT) pre-sample citations1995-1999 0.488 1.374 -1.193 5.852 
d_preCIT dummy (no pre sample citations) 0.851 0.357 0 1 
GROUP dummy 0.720 0.449 0 1 
AGE years 25.497 24.906 1 126 
ln(ASSETS) tangible assets in million € 7.550 2.219 2.833 12.802 
ln(KAPINT) fixed assets / employees  3.013 1.015 0.142 4.465 
  
35 
 
ln(R&D) R&D employees/ employees 0.159 0.163 0 0.693 
 
    
‘Other’ manufacturing (330 obs.) 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outcome variable 
PAT patent count 0.033 0.285 0 4 
AV_CITES citations per patent 0.004 0.041 0 1 
Control variables 
CO dummy 0.100 0.300 0 1 
CO_JOINT dummy 0.091 0.288 0 1 
CO_XCHANGE dummy 0.088 0.284 0 1 
ln(prePAT) pre-sample patents1995-1999 -0.021 0.301 -1.690 2.610 
d_prePAT dummy (no pre sample patents) 0.955 0.209 0 1 
ln(preCIT) pre-sample citations1995-1999 0.011 0.126 0 1.609 
d_preCIT dummy (no pre sample citations) 0.982 0.134 0 1 
GROUP dummy 0.442 0.497 0 1 
AGE years 25.818 16.114 1 85 
ln(ASSETS) tangible assets in million € 6.713 1.901 1 13.733 
ln(KAPINT) fixed assets / employees  3.136 1.191 0 6.381 
ln(R&D) R&D employees/ employees 0.022 0.078 0 0.693 
 
Table A.2: Cross-correlations (4,013 obs.) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1PAT 1
2AV_CITES 0.183 1
3CO 0.177 0.121 1
4CO_JOINT 0.185 0.130 0.925 1
5CO_XCHAN 0.185 0.112 0.862 0.763 1
6ln(prePAT) 0.644 0.266 0.228 0.237 0.221 1
7d_prePAT -0.281 -0.225 -0.238 -0.255 -0.215 -0.353 1
8ln(preCIT) 0.390 0.311 0.222 0.244 0.209 0.515 -0.521 1
9d_preCIT -0.355 -0.263 -0.244 -0.254 -0.219 -0.561 0.716 -0.727 1
10GROUP 0.107 0.083 0.167 0.159 0.172 0.153 -0.189 0.142 -0.161 1
11AGE 0.159 0.038 0.081 0.094 0.078 0.210 -0.124 0.232 -0.210 0.070 1
12ln(ASSETS) 0.226 0.161 0.234 0.240 0.218 0.268 -0.270 0.245 -0.280 0.448 0.247 1
13ln(KAPINT) 0.027 0.033 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 -0.061 0.000 -0.035 0.052 0.023 0.563 1
14ln(R&D) 0.104 0.066 0.344 0.329 0.306 0.088 -0.131 0.118 -0.124 -0.015 -0.096 -0.118 -0.068
 
